home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- From: sgf@cfm.brown.edu (Sam Fulcomer)
- Newsgroups: alt.security,comp.unix.admin
- Subject: Re: NIS and password security
- Message-ID: <95123@brunix.UUCP>
- Date: 5 Dec 91 13:46:11 GMT
- References: <1991Dec4.170052.14839@mp.cs.niu.edu> <KIMMO.SUOMINEN.91Dec4194510@lauri.it.lut.fi> <prl.691873839@iis>
- Organization: Brown University Center for Fluid Mechanics
-
- In article <prl.691873839@iis> prl@iis.ethz.ch (Peter Lamb) writes:
- >There have been a number of queries and some not completely accurate
- >information posted on this question. I'll try to summarise the problem and
- >
- >The problem is this: ypserv is totally indiscriminate about which machines
- >it will respond to queries from. Normal NIS maps can be read by anyone
- >
- >1) The Sun Party Line. "Don't run ypserv on your gateway and disable
- > IP forwarding on the gateway". This is commonly known as a
-
- Well, the most functional arrangement is to have the ypserv'r set up
- with static routes limited to the set of ypbind'rs authorized (no
- default route...).
-
- The following may be a little disjointed, since it's just paste-up
- out of a few of my mbox.out's from the past couple of years.
-
- --------------------
-
- The problem is much grosser. ypbind usually uses a non-priv
- port. Most implementations of the portmapper allow any uid to unregister
- services on non-priv ports. This means that anyone can register a new
- ypbind, perhaps pointing to a ypserv with a passwd map entry something
- like "fooroot" (uid 0).
-
- The way to avoid this on Suns is to run ypbind with the "-s" option. This
- has the undocumented behaviour of running on a privileged
- port, causing portmap to disallow deregistration by non-root. The way to
- avoid it on non-suns that aren't fixed is to _REMOVE_ the "+" entry
- >From the passwd file or run a patched portmap and ypbind (patch the portmap to
- respect privileged ports and patch ypbind to register on one...).
- This is a _really_ ugly problem. If the "+" entry is left in the passwd
- file, even if you're not actually running ypbind, all a user has to do is fire
- it up.
-
- The portmapper is, of course, susceptible to mischief in the form
- of wholesale deregistration of important services.
-
- The smart-money portmapper would only deregister services which
- were registered by a process with matching credentials. At least
- it would make things a dependable as the current crud-type.
-
- If you want reasonably secure yp...
-
- - implement ypexports for ypserv (like /etc/exports). have it
- use /etc/netgroup
-
- - have ypbind always run as root on a reserved port
-
- - have portmap respect services on reserved ports
-
- - make sure that portmap only accepts map/unmap calls from
- the local machine
-
-
-
- --
- _/**/Sam_Fulcomer sgf@cfm.brown.edu What, me panic: uba crazy
-
- Associate Director for Computing Facilities and Scientific Visualization
- Brown University Center for Fluid Mechanics, Turbulence and Computation
-
-